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 “V.I.P” VIDEOGRAPHER INTIMIDATION PROTECTION: HOW THE GOVERNMENT 
SHOULD PROTECT CITIZENS WHO VIDEOTAPE THE POLICE 
 
David Murphy
*
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 With each passing day, more incidents involving police officers, private citizens, and 
video cameras are emerging on the internet, making the news, and sometimes appearing on civil 
and criminal dockets.
1
  When these individuals bring these incidents to public attention, more 
people actively seek to record police, which creates more opportunities for police officers to 
intimidate videographers.
2
  On YouTube, an internet user can watch hours of uploaded footage 
showing police officers aggressively confronting videographers.
3
  These encounters between 
police officers and videographers raise questions about police conduct and the rights of private 
citizens to film police.  Several courts, police departments, and legal scholars have addressed 
these questions, but have failed to reach a consensus as to whether police will stop intimidating 
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1
 See, e.g., Hinhin2, Good Cops, Doing Their Job, Professionally, YOUTUBE (Feb. 28, 2011), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sylrpLhG4w0&NR=1; DanceRooster, How To Invoke Your Rights With the 
Police, YOUTUBE (Jan. 23, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0En_sdsyh1M&feature=related; 
RidleyReport, NH: What to Do When Cops Order Camera Shutoff?, YOUTUBE (Dec. 13, 2008), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vLSptMe3yw0&feature=related; Acumensch, Film Is Not A Crime, YOUTUBE 
(Mar. 7, 2007), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DMDW4Fszj2U.   
2
 See sources cited supra note 1.  The titles of these videos and related posts on the internet indicate that at least 
some private citizens are actively filling the role of providing public oversight to police conduct.  As “how to” and 
other oversight videos continue to be uploaded and earn views, the amount of videos being produced is likely to 
increase, thus increasing the likelihood for confrontations with police over the use of the video camera. 
3
 See, e.g., Ccpafl, Cop Watcher Arrested While Filming Police, YOUTUBE (May 9, 2011), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F_8Bv0wNgCY&feature=related; RTAmerica, Woman Arrested for Filming 
Police, YOUTUBE (June 22, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OtJpL2ZdWVI; HellandKeller, Police vs. 
Civilians w/ Video Camera, YOUTUBE (Aug. 31, 2010), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A_U1oFcCAZo&feature=related.  By using keywords like “police,” 
“intimidation,” and “camera” in the search query, users can endlessly watch videos of confrontations between 
private citizens and police officers regarding the use of video cameras. 
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videographers.
4
  Thus, the power to protect individuals and their rights to film police officers lies 
in the hands of legislatures. 
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit recently addressed some of these questions 
when it decided Glik v. Cunniffe.
5
  Boston police officers arrested Simon Glik for using his 
cellular phone’s digital video camera to film several police officers arresting a young man.6  Glik 
was subsequently charged with violation of Massachusetts’ Anti-Wiretapping Statute7 and two 
other state-law offenses which the Court deemed baseless and thereby dismissed.
8
  Ultimately, 
the First Circuit held that defendant police officers were not entitled to qualified immunity from 
Glik’s constitutional claims because Glik had “clearly established First Amendment rights in 
filming the officers in public space.”9 
Glik demonstrates that the First Circuit is willing to defend a First Amendment right to 
videotape police officers.  But not all courts extend a public right to film police officers, and the 
precise source of the right to film police within the First Amendment is somewhat elusive.
10
  
Arguably, the law is leaning in the direction of “protecting” individuals who film police officers 
in public, but police officers may be actively suppressing the use of video cameras to record 
police conduct.
11
  If a First Amendment right to film police officers exists, or at least ought to 
exist, then state legislatures must protect videographers from overreaching police intimidation. 
 The purpose of this Comment is to discuss police intimidation of videographers and to 
provide a legislative model that protects videographers who film police conduct.  Part II 
discusses how filming police in public is protected First Amendment activity.  Part III exposes 
                                                 
4
 See discussion infra Parts III–IV. 
5
 Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 79 (1st Cir. 2011). 
6
 Id. 
7
 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99 (West 2000). 
8
 Glik, 655 F.3d at 79. 
9
 Id. at 85. 
10
 See infra Part II. 
11
 See infra Part II. 
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how the current legal environment incentivizes police officers to intimidate videographers who 
attempt to film police conduct.  Part IV scrutinizes the current framework of deterrents designed 
to prevent police misconduct and discusses why these safeguards fail to protect videographers.  
Part V proposes a bright-line rule imposing harsh punishments to effectively deter police officers 
from intimidating law-abiding videographers who capture police conduct on camera.  Lastly, 
Part VI will provide the conclusion of this discussion. 
II.  Filming Police Officers in Public and First Amendment Protection 
 This section provides an overview of the ambiguous First Amendment right to film police 
in public and discusses how legal and academic consensus is trending towards protection for 
videographers.  Some courts have already held that the First Amendment protects filming police 
officers, but these courts have failed to precisely explain such a right’s origins and limitations.12  
Other courts, however, have not recognized a broad right to film police within the First 
Amendment.
13
  Despite this dissonance, a First Amendment right to film police officers in public 
will probably solidify in the future based on recent court decisions and legal scholarship arguing 
for such a right.
14
 
                                                 
12
 See, e.g., Smith v. City of Cummings, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that the plaintiffs “had a 
First-Amendment right, subject to reasonable time, manner and place restrictions, to photograph or videotape police 
conduct,” and that the First Amendment “protects the right to gather information about what public officials do on 
public property,” but failing to clearly elaborate where in the First Amendment such a powerful right exists); State v. 
Graber, No. 12-K-10-647, 2010 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 7, at *33–34 (Sept. 27, 2010) (“[S]tatutes which implicate the 
free speech protections of the First Amendment must be narrowly construed.”). 
13
 See, e.g., Pomykacz v. Borough of W. Wildwood, 438 F. Supp. 2d 504, 512–13 n.14 (D.N.J. 2006) (explaining 
that the act of photographing, by itself, is not sufficiently communicative and therefore not subject to First-
Amendment protection, regardless of whether or not the subject is a public servant). 
14
 See Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 85 (1st Cir. 2011). See generally Caycee Hampton, Case Comment: 
Confirmation of a Catch-22: Glik v. Cunniffe and the Paradox of Citizen Recording, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1549 (2011); 
Seth F. Kreimer, Pervasive Image Capture and the First Amendment: Memory, Discourse, and the Right to Record, 
159 U. PA. L. REV. 335 (2011);  Lisa A. Skehill, Cloaking Police Misconduct in Privacy: Why the Massachusetts 
Anti-Wiretapping Statute Should Allow For the Surreptitious Recording of Police Officers, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.  
981 (2009); Howard W. Wasserman, Orwell’s Vision: Video and the Future of Civil Rights Enforcement, 68 MD. L. 
REV. 600, 665 (2009). 
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In relevant part, the First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that 
“Congress shall make no law . . .  abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of 
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”15  
Despite lacking direct reference to the language of the First Amendment, Glik recognized an 
“unambiguous” right to gather and disseminate information related to matters of public interest, 
especially police conduct.
16
  Likewise, the Supreme Court has indicated that First Amendment 
protection extends beyond the press, and to individuals like Glik, in regard to gathering public 
information.
17
   
But precisely how the First Amendment affords such protection is not clearly 
established.
18
  In Glik, First Circuit Judge Lipez remarked that “the First Amendment’s aegis 
extends further than the text’s proscription on laws ‘abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press,’ and encompasses a range of conduct” related to information-gathering and 
dissemination.
19
  To connect these principles to the filming of police officers in public, the court 
declared that “[t]he filming of . . . police officers performing their responsibilities” is a “cardinal 
First Amendment interest in protecting and promoting” information-gathering, dissemination, 
and “free discussion of government affairs.”20  The court easily categorized Glik’s activity as 
                                                 
15
 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
16
 Glik, 655 F.3d at 85 (holding that “though not unqualified, a citizen’s right to film government officials, including 
law enforcement officers, in the discharge of their duties in a public space is a basic, vital, and well-established 
liberty safeguarded by the First Amendment”). 
17
 See First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978); Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 11 
(1978); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681–82 (1972). 
18
 See Glik, 655 F.3d at 82.  In opinions such as Fordyce, the court merely glanced over “the First Amendment right 
to film matters of public interest” without sufficiently explaining where the right is derived from.  Fordyce v. City of 
Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 439 (9th Cir. 1995). 
19
 Glik, 655 F.3d at 82 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Belotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978) (extending the First 
Amendment’s reach in Glik by attributing that it “goes beyond protection of the press and self-expression of 
individuals to prohibit government from limiting the stock of information from which members of the public may 
draw”). 
20
 Id. (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)); see also Smith v. City of Cummings, 212 F.3d 1332, 
1333 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing Blackston v. Alabama, 30 F.3d 117, 120 (11th Cir. 1994) ) ( “[T]he First Amendment 
protects the right to gather information about what public officials do on public property, and specifically, a right to 
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information-gathering and dissemination but it failed to clearly support why that activity was 
actually protected by the First Amendment.
21
  Circuit Judge Lipez strongly supported his 
position with case law like Smith v. City of Cumming and Fordyce v. City of Seattle.
22
  However, 
upon closer inspection, those Supreme Court opinions merely addressed a videographer’s First 
Amendment rights in passing and failed to precisely derive the source of protection from the 
language of the First Amendment.
23
  The majority of the sources used in Glik are somewhat 
ambiguous as to how the right to film matters of public concern is actually protected First 
Amendment activity.
24
 
However, one source provides more specific insight on how filming police officers is 
protected First Amendment activity.  Glik cited Robinson v. Fetterman, which held that 
individuals have a free-speech right to film police officers in the course of their public 
activities.
25
  By at least referencing the Speech Clause (“Congress shall make no law . . . 
abridging the freedom of speech”),26 the court in Robinson modestly provided some legitimate 
constitutional support for what Glik would ultimately declare to be a “clearly-established” First 
Amendment right to film police officers in public.
27
  
                                                                                                                                                             
record matters of public interest.”); Fordyce, 55 F.3d at 439; Iacobucci v. Boulter, No. CIV.A. 94-10531, 1997 WL 
258494 (D.Mass. Mar. 26, 1997)). 
21
 See Glik, 655 F.3d at 82. 
22
 Id. at 83 (citing Smith, 212 F.3d at 1333; Fordyce, 55 F.3d at 439).  Amongst others cited to support the 
proposition that “the First Amendment protects the filming of government officials in public spaces” are Schnell v. 
City of Chicago, 407 F.2d 1084 (7th Cir. 1969), and Connell v. Town of Hudson, 733 F. Supp. 465 (D.N.H. 1990). 
23
 Smith, 212 F.3d at 1333 (where the plaintiffs allege that police harassed them for filming police activity, the court 
merely stated that it “agreed” that the plaintiffs had a First-Amendment right and provided no further First-
Amendment analysis).  See generally Fordyce, 55 F.3d 436 (this opinion does not discuss the merits of a First-
Amendment right to film but merely rejects the defendants’ motion for summary judgment since a genuine issue of 
material fact existed in regard to whether or not the plaintiff’s rights were violated when police seized and smashed 
his camera). 
24
 See Glik, 655 F.3d at 82 (citing Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777 n.11; Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1035–
36 (1991); Mills, 384 U.S. at 218). 
25
 Robinson v. Fetterman, 378 F. Supp. 2d 534, 541 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (“Videotaping is a legitimate means of 
gathering information for public dissemination and can often provide cogent evidence . . . there can be no doubt that 
the free speech clause o the Constitution protected Robinson as he videotaped the [police officers].”). 
26
 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
27
 Glik, 655 F.3d at 79. 
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Branching off from the Speech Clause, some legal scholars have more thoroughly 
derived the existence of a First Amendment right to film police officers.
28
  The right to gather 
and disseminate information may be derived from three elements within the First Amendment: 
the Speech Clause (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech”); the 
Press Clause (“or of the press”); and the Petition Clause (“the right of the people . . . to petition 
the Government for a redress of grievances”).29  The Speech Clause protects the direct 
dissemination of speech, whether the dissemination is the speech itself or conduct that 
necessarily facilitates the speech.
30
  Similarly, the Press Clause is interpreted to protect 
reasonable conduct antecedent to expression, such as legitimate means of news-gathering.
31
  
Lastly, the Petition Clause protects information-gathering for private citizens seeking resolution 
of legal disputes and for general purposes of self-governance.
32
   
Conceivably, filming police officers could satisfy all three First Amendment clauses that 
form the right to gather and disseminate information.  Hypothetically, a videographer could 
decide to make a documentary about the state of law enforcement in his community by video-
recording the local police on duty.  The videographer’s commentary about law enforcement 
would be the “speech” itself in satisfaction of the Speech Clause and, absent additional conduct 
                                                 
28
 Wasserman, supra note 14, at 665. 
29
 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
30
 A.C.L.U. of Nev. v. City of Las Vegas, 466 F.3d 784, 797–99 (9th Cir. 2006). 
31
 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972) (“We do not question the significance of free speech, press, or 
assembly to the country’s welfare.  Nor is it suggested that news gathering does not qualify for First-Amendment 
protection; without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated.”); Barry P. 
McDonald, The First Amendment and the Free Flow of Information: Towards a Realistic Right to Gather 
Information in the Information Age, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 249, 354 (2004) (noting that the Speech Clause and Press 
Clause may not necessarily even be separate sources of the right to disseminate information, but traditional press 
gets extensive First-Amendment protection for its structure news-gathering conduct). 
32
 See Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2494 (2011); Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 896–
97 (1984); see also McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 483 (1985) (“The values in the right of petition as an 
important aspect of self-government are beyond question.”). 
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warranting police intervention, would be facially reasonable.
33
  The Press Clause would protect 
the actual act of filming the police officers in public because it is a necessary and common 
means of news-gathering.
34
  Lastly, since a documentary could make a comment about law 
enforcement, the documentary would have a general purpose for self-governance, thus satisfying 
the Petition Clause.
35
  Albeit somewhat simplistic, this model provides how filming police is 
protected First Amendment activity directly from the language of the First Amendment itself.   
Alternatively, instead of focusing on a right to gather and disseminate information, some 
scholars argue that a right to film police officers can be derived from “freedom of expression.”36  
For instance, captured images from photography or video-recording can be “like words inscribed 
on parchment” and therefore fall within the realm of First Amendment protection.37  The analogy 
is that a videographer and his recording are the same as a writer to his writings.  Since the 
government cannot interfere with a writer chronicling his thoughts and beliefs, likewise it cannot 
disrupt a videographer recording in public.
38
  However, courts have rejected this view, stating 
that an image, or video, is not necessarily expression that warrants protection because no idea is 
communicated from merely recording.
39
  Courts, in determining whether an isolated expression 
                                                 
33
 Robinson v. Fetterman, 378 F. Supp. 2d 534, 541 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (“Taking photographs at a public event is a 
facially innocent act.”). 
34
 See id.  Filming or videotaping is an essential part of reporting information and without the right to video-record, 
information-gathering could not possibly be effective as it is.  Id.  (“Videotaping is a legitimate means of gathering 
information for public dissemination.”). 
35
 Debate on public issues should be uninhibited even if they include unpleasant attacks and scrutiny on the 
government and public officials.  See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964) (“For speech concerning 
public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government. . . . [D]ebate on public issues should 
be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly 
sharp attacks on government and public officials.”). 
36
 See Kreimer, supra note 14, at 379. 
37
 Id. 
38
 Id. (“The government is barred from intermeddling . . . in both speech and thought . . . [which] undergird the 
constitutional commitments to personal autonomy and popular sovereignty.”). 
39
 Montefusco v. Nassau Cnty., 39 F. Supp. 2d 231, 241–42 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (stating that to warrant protection, 
“there must still be (1) a message to be communicated and (2) an audience to receive that message regardless of the 
medium in which the message is sought to be expressed. . . . [I]f either is lacking, there is absolutely nothing to 
transmit from ‘mind to mind’”); see also Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 
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was protectable as “symbolic speech,” have weighed the presence or absence of a “message 
conveyed” in the act which could constitute expression.40  Compared to the right to gather and 
disseminate information, the freedom of expression analysis is somewhat weaker. 
Overall, although courts have failed to sufficiently discern a First Amendment right to 
film police officers in public, a solid argument exists for such a right.  The right to gather and 
disseminate information, when derived from the Speech Clause, the Press Clause, and the 
Petition Clause, fairly applies to a situation like Glik, where a concerned citizen publicly sought 
to document the activity of law enforcement officers with his video camera.
41
  Thus, the right to 
film police officers in public has at least some identifiable roots in the plain language of the First 
Amendment. 
III. Incentives for Police Officers to Intimidate Videographers 
 Despite “sweeping” decisions like Glik which strongly protect videographers’ rights,42 
police engage in arrests and intimidation tactics to suppress videographers from filming police 
conduct in public.
43
  This Part of the Comment discusses why.  Specifically, this Part focuses on 
three aspects of the legal environment which compel some police officers to actively confront, 
intimidate, and even arrest individuals for filming police conduct in a public space: first, how 
police are often threatened by videographers; second, the advantages police wish to maintain in 
courtrooms; and lastly, the confusing state of anti-wiretapping statutes and laws of general 
applicability which often falsely justify arrests.  Because of these three conditions, police officers 
                                                                                                                                                             
568 (1995); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974); Bery v. 
City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 695 (2d Cir. 1996). 
40
 See Montefusco, 39 F. Supp. 2d at 241–42; Kreimer, supra note 14, at 371. 
41
 See Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 79 (1st Cir. 2011). 
42
 Erica Goode, New Tool for Police, the Video Camera, and New Legal Issues to Go With It, GOUPSTATE.COM, Oct. 
11, 2011, http://www.goupstate.com/article/20111011/ZNYT02/110113009/1088/sports?p=4&tc=pg&tc=ar.  
43
ReasonTV, The Government’s War on Cameras!, YOUTUBE (May 26, 2011), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=LY0MUARqisM#! (interviewing Professor Eugene 
Volokh, who remarks “as it happens, the unfortunate reality is that often officers can intimidate people into not 
doing things they otherwise legally could”). 
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will continue to suppress video recording of police conduct regardless of how the First 
Amendment applies to the issue. 
 Police are often uncomfortable and threatened by civilians with video cameras.
44
  The 
basic reality is that some police officers do not appreciate being videotaped, which results in 
aggressive reactions from police officers toward videographers.
45
  Generally, “[p]olice, like 
many civilians, are often camera-shy” and “dislike being recorded in embarrassing situations and 
may be concerned that dissemination of their images may put them at risk of retaliation.”46  
Additionally, police officers often view videography as a challenge to their authority.
47
  
Considering those challenges to authority and the fear of retaliation, the problem for police is 
how to respond where every citizen is a potential threat of surveillance and scrutiny.
48
  Police 
face potential bombardment from videographers since recording devices are cheaper and handier 
than ever.
49
  With the proliferation of cheap and handy recording technology, police encounters 
in public are more commonly captured on portable media that is disseminated almost instantly, 
allowing the public to constantly scrutinize and form opinions of the police.
50
   
                                                 
44
 See, e.g., Police v. Civilians w/ Video Camera, supra note 3 (where the filmed police officer admitted, in 
apologizing to the videographers after they had a discussion with his superior, that he “was trying to intimidate” the 
videographers). 
45
 See id. 
46
 Kreimer, supra note 14, at 357. 
47
 See Daniel Rowinski, Police Fight Cellphone Recordings, BOS. GLOBE, Jan. 12, 2010, 
http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2010/01/12/police_fight_cellphone_recordings/ (quoting 
David Ardia, Director of the Citizen Media Law Project at Harvard’s Berman Center for Internet and Society, 
“[p]olice are not used to ceding power, and [video cameras] are forcing them to cede power”). 
48
 Kevin Johnson, For Cops, Citizen Videos Bring Increased Scrutiny, USA TODAY, Oct. 18, 2010, 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2010-10-15-1Avideocops15_CV_N.htm  (quoting San Jose Police Chief Rob 
Davis, “[t]here is no city not at risk of a video showing an officer doing something wrong . . . [t]he question, when 
one of these videos surface, is what we do about it”). 
49
 Wasserman, supra note 14, at 617–18 (“Technology improvement means that recorded evidence of police-public 
encounters, good and bad, will be the norm, more frequently and more widely disseminated, within and without the 
news media.”). 
50
 See Ray Sanchez, Growing Number of Prosecutions for Videotaping the Police, ABC NEWS, July 19, 2010, 
http://abcnews.go.com/US/TheLaw/videotaping-cops-arrest/story?id=11179076#.TrW-BXKwXf8; Keith B. 
Richburg, New York’s Video Vigilante, Scourge of Parking Enforcers, WASH. POST, Aug. 3, 2008, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/02/AR2008080201503.html (describing the 
increasing trend of amateur  videos of police conduct on YouTube). 
10 
 
Police assert that this trend is a threat to certain societal interests.
51
  Jim Pasco, the 
executive director of the Fraternal Order of Police,
52
 remarked that the proliferation of cheap 
video equipment  has “a chilling effect on some officers who are now afraid to act for fear of 
retribution by video.”53  Pasco’s statement implies that video causes police officers to second-
guess their actions before they act.
54
  This means that the police officers either act differently or 
put less consideration into their actions when they know their conduct is not recorded on camera.  
If a police officer knew that his conduct was lawful, justified, and otherwise correct, he would 
not hesitate from acting regardless of whether or not a videographer is recording his conduct.  A  
police officer’s hesitation when he knows his conduct is being recorded reinforces the argument 
that the filming of police officers in public causes police officers to lawfully and thoughtfully 
conduct police business.  Pasco and the police seem to consider recorded observation of police 
conduct to be a defect of society’s new power to digitally record in the public, but perhaps it is 
actually a positive feature which reduces occurrences of police misconduct.
55
 
 As the voice of the world’s largest organization of law enforcement officers,56 Pasco 
established that some police are threatened by the concept that they are under surveillance.
57
  In 
an interview with Reason Magazine’s Radley Balko, Pasco supported the arrests of individuals 
                                                 
51
 Johnson, supra note 48 (reporting that some police organizations believe “videotaping officers poses broad risks 
that reach beyond internet embarrassments: It could cause officers to hesitate in life-threatening situations”). 
52
 FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, THE VOICE OF OUR NATION’S LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS, http://www.fop.net 
(last visited Nov. 5, 2011) (“The Fraternal Order of Police is the world’s largest organization of sworn law 
enforcement officers, with more than 325,000 members in more than 2,100 lodges. We are the voice of those who 
dedicate their lives to protecting and serving our communities. . . . [N]o one knows police officers better than the 
FOP.”). 
53
 Johnson, supra note 48. 
54
 See id. 
55
 Radley Balko, Police Officers Don’t Check Their Civil Rights at the Station House Door, REASON (Aug. 9, 2010), 
http://reason.com/archives/2010/08/09/police-officers-dont-check-the (referencing how the Washington Post, USA 
Today, the Washington Examiner, the Washington Times, and other commentators have “all weighed in on the side 
that citizen photography and videography can be an important check to keep police officers accountable and 
transparent”).  
56
 FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, supra note 52. 
57
 See Johnson, supra note 48. 
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like Anthony Graber,
58
 who faced over fifteen years in prison for filming his own traffic stop, 
because the video could be manipulated to negatively portray police officers.
59
  Pasco elaborated 
that civilian video could be edited or taken out of context, and when the video is not in the 
custody or control of law enforcement, it is rightly inadmissible as evidence.
60
  Further, Pasco 
asserted that “[l]etting people record police officers is an extreme and intrusive response to a 
problem that’s so rare it might as well not exist.  It would be like saying we should do away with 
DNA evidence because there’s a one in a billion chance that it could be wrong [sic].”61  The 
“problem” that Pasco is referring to is police misconduct that is uncovered by civilian 
videography.
62
  Overall, if Pasco truly represents the largest law enforcement organization in the 
world, then the law-enforcement community views the act of filming a police officer as “extreme 
and intrusive.”63  This anxiety explains why police officers may be particularly aggressive 
toward videographers. 
 An important reason why video threatens police officers is that civilian recordings have 
revealed serious inconvenient truths and exposed horrible incidents of police misconduct—most 
notably, the Rodney King incident.
64
  Arguably, prohibitions on video recording and image 
                                                 
58
 See State v. Graber, No. 12-K-10-647, 2010 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 7 (Sept. 27, 2010).  Maryland state police 
officers raided Anthony Graber’s home, confiscated his camera, computers, and hard drive, and arrested him for 
violating state wiretap laws when he posted the video of himself being pulled over by a gun-wielding undercover 
police officer on YouTube.   Sanchez, supra note 50.  Maryland Circuit Court Judge Emory A. Pitt Jr. dismissed the 
case reasoning that law enforcement officers enjoy a very narrow expectation of privacy in the performance of their 
duties.  Graber, 2010 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 7 at *7–8; see also Peter Hermann, Judge Says Man Within Rights to 
Record Police Traffic Stop, BALT. SUN, Sept. 27, 2010, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2010-09-27/news/bs-md-
recorded-traffic-stop-20100927_1_police-officers-plitt-cell-phones; Anthony Graber, Cop Pulls Out Gun On 
Motorcyclist, YOUTUBE (June 5, 2010),  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RK5bMSyJCsg.  
59
 Balko, supra note 55. 
60
 Id. 
61
 Id. 
62
 See id. 
63
 Id.  Pasco is not referring to conduct surrounding recording or police officers, just the act of recording alone.  Id. 
(Pasco remarks “[y]ou have 960,000 police officers in this country, and millions of contacts between those officers 
and citizens.  I’ll bet you can’t name 10 incidents [sic] where a citizen video has shown a police officer to have lied 
on a police report. . . . Letting people record police officers is an extreme and intrusive.”). 
64
 See Jim Kavanagh, Rodney King, 20 Years Later, CNN, Mar. 3, 2011, http://articles.cnn.com/2011-03-
03/us/rodney.king.20.years.later_1_laurence-powell-theodore-briseno-king-attorney-milton-grimes?_s=PM:US; see 
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capture “are deployed to suppress inconvenient truths.”65  The police’s desire to censor 
videographers supports the argument that police officers are interested in controlling public 
perception of their conduct, and not just interferences with police business.  Since police record 
their own conduct at nearly all times they are on duty, justifications for censoring videographers 
from recording the exact same conduct seem unreasonable.
66
  Police previously maintained a 
monopoly over the ability to record public confrontations using cameras in cruisers and 
recording equipment attached to officers.
67
  However, the power to record is no longer 
unilaterally in police possession since private citizens can cheaply record their lives with 
minimal effort.
68
  Potential First Amendment rights in filming police, broad availability of 
recording devices, and cultural obsession with posting personal videos on the internet eliminates 
any shroud of secrecy that police could maintain in the public discharge of their duties.
69
  This 
threatening environment encourages police officers to either act appropriately at all times, being 
conscious that they are under surveillance, or intimidate videographers to reduce their incentives 
to film police conduct.
70
  Thus, some police officers seek to chill the public from filming their 
conduct because that conduct may be illegal, while others like Pasco, find the act of recording 
                                                                                                                                                             
also Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963, 971–72 (Mass. 2001) (Marshall, C.J., dissenting) (commenting on 
the importance of George Holliday’s infamous  recording of the Rodney King incident). 
65
 Kreimer, supra note 14, at 383. 
66
 Wasserman, supra note 14, at 651 (stating that “the basic act of recording officers in the performance of their 
official duties does not burden the officer or interfere ability”); Goode, supra note 42. 
67
 INT’L. ASSOC. OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, THE IMPACT OF VIDEO EVIDENCE ON MODERN POLICING 13–26 (2004), 
available at http://cops.usdoj.gov/RIC/ResourceDetail.aspx?RID=404 (“Attorneys representing [police] agencies 
categorically support the use of the in-camera.  They pointed out that video evidence allows them to save time in 
case disposition.  On rare occasions, after reviewing the video evidence, they decided to settle the case in lieu of 
proceeding to trial. . . . [T]he presence of the video evidence allow[s] the agency to defend the officer with great 
success.”). 
68
 See Rowinski, supra note 47 (“[T]he proliferation of cellphone and other technology has equipped people to 
record actions in public.”). 
69
 Id. 
70
 See Balko, supra note 55. 
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police to be inherently intrusive.
71
  It is for these reasons that police officers are incentivized to 
confront, intimidate, and arrest videographers. 
 When the biggest threats to police credibility were merely eye witnesses disseminating 
their accounts of an incident, police could at least attempt to plausibly deny embarrassing or 
illegal conduct.
72
  However, once the availability of portable recordable media exploded, police 
officers lost the advantages of plausibility, deniability, and controlled documentation of the 
incident.
73
  In “he-said, she-said” factual disputes, police officers are usually given the benefit of 
the doubt during proceedings.
74
  In forming the record, police are accustomed to substantial 
deference, and many prefer to be in a position where they can shape the perception of their 
actions without competing against a digital record.
75
  In cases of police misconduct, the facts are 
often reduced to a citizen’s word against the police officer’s word.76  Juries are inclined to 
believe police officers moreso than ordinary citizens.
77
  So, prior to the widespread use of 
recording devices, police officers maintained a strategic advantage in creating the record.   
 As portable videography proliferates, police lose their strategic courtroom advantage.  
For instance, after Prince George’s County riot police beat Jack McKenna, police officers 
provided sworn statements that McKenna “struck [the] officers and their horses, causing minor 
                                                 
71
 Id. 
72
 See INT’L ASSOC. OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, supra note 67, at 5–6 (discussing the history of video recording in police 
cruisers, effectively beginning in the 1980s). 
73
 See Rowinski, supra note 47. 
74
 See Sanchez, supra note 50 (quoting James Green, an attorney for Sharron Tasha Ford, a woman for whom the 
ACLU of Florida filed a First-Amendment lawsuit after she was arrested for videotaping an encounter between 
police and her teenage son at a movie theatre, “[j]udges and juries want to believe law enforcement . . . they want to 
believe police officers and unless you have credible evidence to contradict police officers, it’s often very difficult to 
believe the word of a citizen over a police officer”).  
75
 Kreimer, supra note 14, at 357. 
76
 See, e.g., Youa Vang Lee v. Anderson, Civ. No. 07-1205, 2009 WL 1287832, at *9 (D. Minn. May 6, 2009) 
(concluding, despite heavily disputed facts, that both the police officer who shot the plaintiff’s son and the city were 
entitled to summary judgment because the plaintiff failed to produce any evidence of a policy or custom to be the 
cause of the police officer’s alleged misconduct). 
77
 See Skehill, supra note 14, at 998; Alison L. Patton, The Endless Cycle of Abuse: Why 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is 
Ineffective in Deterring Police Brutality, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 753, 764–65 (1993); Wasserman, supra note 14, at 618. 
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injuries.”78 These sworn statements were directly contradicted by amateur video footage of the 
incident, which indisputably demonstrated that McKenna never touched the police officers or 
their horses but was actually calmly retreating when multiple riot police battered him against a 
wall and beat with him batons as he laid on the ground.
79
  Ultimately, the state dropped all 
charges against McKenna and the Prince George’s County Police Chief, Roberto Hylton, 
suspended one police officer.
80
 
 As the McKenna case illustrated, police officers can lose their credibility very quickly if 
outside recordings are brought to the attention of the public and the court.  Video evidence is so 
effective because the images provide a “direct, unmediated view of the reality they depict,” and 
viewers, such as jury members, are more likely to accept those images as “credible 
representations” of how events actually transpired.81  Compared to verbal descriptions of events, 
images are often more powerful for the viewer because the character of the medium is self-
authenticating.
82
  When officers are caught “blatantly contradict[ing]” video evidence, the result 
is fierce public criticism and sometimes suspension, firing, embarrassment, or civil damages.
83
  
Thus, expanding the availability of video reduces the likelihood that a police officer could 
successfully make a false statement.   
                                                 
78
 Bradley Blackburn, University of Maryland Student Brutally Beaten By Police After Basketball Game, ABC 
NEWS, Apr. 13, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/WN/video-shows-university-maryland-student-beaten-county-
police/story?id=10362033#.TrYI7HKwXf8. 
79
 Id.; Roberts and Wood Law, Beating and Arrest of Jack McKenna - April 3, 2011,  YOUTUBE (Dec. 10, 2010), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zcrnnmt8cg8.  
80
 Blackburn, supra note 78. 
81
 See Wasserman, supra note 14, at 619 (quoting RICHARD K. SHERWIN, POPULAR CULTURE AND LAW xiv (Richard 
K. Sherwin ed., 2006)). 
82
 Kreimer, supra note 14, at 386. 
83
 See Wasserman, supra note 14, at 651–52; see also Trymaine Lee, Police Officer Who Shoved a Bicyclist Is Off 
the Job, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2009, at A24.  But see, Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 343 (1983) (establishing that 
police officers who commit perjury have an absolute immunity against suits for money damages because allowing 
officers to be sued for their testimony as witnesses “might undermine not only their contribution to the judicial 
process but also the effective performance of their other public duties”). 
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Additionally, video evidence is particularly important in the resolution of civil rights 
claims that follow allegations of police misconduct.  For example, video evidence can drastically 
change  the outcomes of § 1983 civil rights actions.
84
  Courts understand video evidence as 
“singularly powerful” and “an unambiguous source of proof.”85  Fundamentally, video is 
perceived as truthful, objective, and generally unambiguous which often gives the video 
evidence dispositive weight in determining the outcome of the civil rights claim.
86
  Because 
videography has this power, police are tempted to preserve their advantage in recording by 
preventing outside videographers from ever capturing police conduct in the first place.
87
  Since a 
videographer may capture police misconduct that the officer cannot plausibly deny, police have 
to choose between acting appropriately or preventing the creation of evidence of misconduct.  As 
a result of this dilemma, some police officers have chosen the latter option, and the result is 
intimidation, harassment, and sometimes arrests of videographers who film police officers.
88
 
 When police arrest videographers, the videographers often demand justification for the 
arrest.
89
  Police officers commonly cite either the local jurisdiction’s anti-wiretapping statute90 or 
                                                 
84
 See, e.g., Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007) (discussing how the “existence in the record of a videotape 
capturing the events in question” is an “added wrinkle” to the resolution of the case). 
85
 Wasserman, supra note 14, at 607; see also Marvin v. City of Taylor, 509 F.3d 234, 239–40 (6th Cir. 2007); 
Beshers v. Harrison, 495 F.3d 1260, 1262 n.1 (11th Cir. 2007). 
86
 Wasserman, supra note 14, at 607. 
87
 See Rowinski, supra note 47. 
88
 See sources cited supra note 3. 
89
 See sources cited supra note 3. 
90
 47 U.S.C. § 605 (2006); ALA. CODE § 13A-11-31 (1975); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 42.20.310 (West 2007); ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3005 (2010);  ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-60-120 (West 2008); CAL. PENAL CODE § 631 (West 
2011); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-304 (West 2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §53a-189 (West 2007); DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 11 § 1335 (West 2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.03 (West 2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-62 (West 2009); HAW. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 711-1111 (West 2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6702 (West 2006); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-2 
(West 2006); IND. CODE § 35-33.5-1 (2004); IOWA CODE ANN. § 727.8 (West 2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6101 
(West 2008); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 526.020 (West 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:1303 (West 2005); ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 710 (2003); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-402 (West 2002); MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. ch. 272, § 99 (West 2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.539 (West 2004); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626A.02 
(West 2009); MO. ANN. STAT. § 542.402 (West 2002); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-213 (2009); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 200.650 (West 2000); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 570-A:2 (2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:156A-3 (West 2011); N.Y. 
PENAL LAW § 250.05 (McKinney 2008); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-287 (West 2009); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 
12.1-15-02 (West 2008); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 29533.52 (West 2006); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 13. § 176.3 (West 
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general laws such as obstruction of justice or failure to obey a police order.
91
  Because of the 
confusing state of these laws, especially the anti-wiretapping statutes, citizens are often ignorant 
of precisely how the law applies to their videography, which allows police officers to intimidate 
videographers.
92
  Although police may say otherwise, no law directly prohibits a videographer 
from filming or photographing things in public.
93
  Nevertheless, some police still attempt to 
combat the spread of public surveillance of police conduct through other existing statutes and 
“creative prosecutorial discretion.”94 
 Police often rely on anti-wiretapping statutes
95
 to arrest civilians who insist on recording 
the police officers without their consent.
96
  In most states and under federal jurisdictions, the 
anti-wiretapping statutes only require one party to consent for legal recording or eavesdropping 
of a communication.
97
  In these “one-party-consent” jurisdictions, if one person consents to the 
                                                                                                                                                             
2002); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 165.540 (West 2003); 18 PA. STAT. ANN. § 5703 (West 2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 
11-35-21 (West 2006); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-29-20 (2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-35A-20 (2004); TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 39-13-601 (West 2011); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 16.02 (West 2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-402 (West 
2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-62 (West 2007); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.73.030 (West 2010); W. VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 62-1D-3 (West 2002); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 968.31 (West 2007).  States missing from this list are Mississippi, 
Nebraska, New Mexico, and Wyoming.  Vermont does not have an anti-wiretapping statute in effect.  For a 
discussion on the problems with state wiretap laws, see Marianne F. Kies, Policing the Police: Freedom of the 
Press, the Right to Privacy, and Civilian Recordings of Police Activity, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 274 (2011). 
91
 Stossel, The War On Cameras, YOUTUBE (Apr. 23, 2011), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2Eu0E1znMZM&feature=related (interviewing Radley Balko, Senior Editor of 
Reason Magazine). 
92
 See State v. Graber, No. 12-K-10-647, 2010 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 7, at *6 (Sept. 27, 2010) (where Judge Pitt 
remarked that Maryland’s anti-wiretap statute “on its face is unconstitutional; that it is unconstitutional and violate 
of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution”); The Government’s War on Cameras!, supra note 43 
(interviewing Professor Eugene Volokh, who adds that “not everyone knows what the law is, and sometimes not 
even all police officers know what the law is”). 
93
 See The Government’s War on Cameras!, supra note 43 (quoting Professor Eugene Volokh: “[I]n the jurisdictions 
of which I am aware, there is no prohibition on video-recording or photographing things when you are standing in a 
public place and you’re looking at another public place”). 
94
 See Kreimer, supra note 14, at 357. 
95
 See sources cited supra note 90. 
96
 See Kreimer, supra note 14, at 378. 
97
 See sources cited supra note 90.  Only twelve jurisdictions in the United States have two-party consent 
requirements in the wiretap statute.  These jurisdictions are: California, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and Washington.  The Government’s 
War on Cameras!, supra note 43; see also Stossel, supra note 91. 
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recording, including the person recording the communication, the conduct is legal.
98
  Assuming 
the videographer is consenting to his own action, police cannot reasonably expect to prosecute or 
arrest a videographer in “one-party-consent” jurisdictions for anti-wiretapping reasons.  
However, Massachusetts and eleven other jurisdictions (“all-party-consent” jurisdictions) 
criminalize recording unless every party in the communication consents to the recording.
99
   
Amongst “all-party-consent” jurisdictions, the issue of whether or not police officers are 
protected by anti-wiretapping laws is hotly debated.
100
  Some jurisdictions require that parties 
have a “reasonable expectation of privacy” in their communication in order to receive protection 
from anti-wiretapping statutes.
101
  A strong argument in these jurisdictions is that police officers 
do not have a “reasonable expectation of privacy” when conducting police business in public.102  
Police officers ought not to expect privacy in public communication because of the public 
interest in police oversight, along with the fact that police communications in the line of public 
duty are generally less intimate than communications in other contexts.
103
  In addressing this 
issue, some courts have found that police cannot enjoy a “reasonable expectation of privacy” in 
the public discharge of their duties, while other courts have found that an expectation of privacy 
                                                 
98
 See Indiana Recording Law, CITIZEN MEDIA LAW PROJECT, http://www.citmedialaw.org/legal-
guide/indiana/indiana-recording-law (last visited Jan. 17, 2012) (explaining that “you may record a telephone 
conversation if you are a party to the conversation or you get permission from one party to the conversation”).  The 
purpose of the anti-wiretapping statutes in “one-party-consent” jurisdictions is to prevent a third party from 
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 See sources cited supra note 90. 
100
 Compare Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963, 966 (Mass. 2001) (rejecting the argument that police are 
exempt from anti-wiretapping laws because they lack reasonable expectations of privacy in public communications), 
with Hornberger v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 351 N.J. Super. 577, 627 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (discussing 
how the New Jersey statute allows for members of the public to secretly record conversations when the speakers 
have no reasonable expectation of privacy). 
101
 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2006); Hornberger, 351 N.J. Super. at 627. 
102
 See Hyde, 750 N.E.2d at 965 (where the defendant validly but unsuccessfully argued that police officers do not 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their words during a traffic stop). 
103
 See Dina Mishra, Undermining Excessive Privacy For Police: Citizen Tape Recording To Check Police Officers’ 
Power, 117 YALE L.J. 1549, 1555 (2008). 
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is not necessary for a violation of an anti-wiretapping statute to occur.
104
  In jurisdictions which 
require a “reasonable expectation of privacy,” most courts have found that police officers are 
public officials, and as such, they are not afforded a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
public discharge of their duties.
105
 
Another element of confusion added to these types of cases is the differentiation between 
video and audio recording.
106
  Many jurisdictions, in not requiring “all-party consent,” may still 
require that all parties to the communication be informed or put on notice that the conversation is 
being recorded.
107
  A party may provide notice by showing a video camera in plain sight.
108
  On 
the other hand, for conduct to be covered by an anti-wiretapping statute, it may also need to be 
an “oral communication,” which may exclude video from the scope of the anti-wiretapping 
statute.
109
  In Glik, the police officer, assuming Massachusetts’ anti-wiretapping statute only 
applied to audio, asked Glik if his cellular phone recorded audio.
110
  It was only after Glik 
answered in the affirmative that police officers arrested him under color of the anti-wiretapping 
statute.
111
  In resolving Glik, the First Circuit failed to differentiate between the audio and video 
aspects of Glik’s recording.112  Instead, the court simply declared that Glik had a  “well 
                                                 
104
 See Hyde, 750 N.E.2d at 965 (upholding Michael Hyde’s conviction because the legislature expressly established 
a ban on surreptitious recording to protect privacy, even for police officers).  But see State v. Graber, No. 12-K-10-
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 See O’Brien v. DiGrazia, 544 F.2d 543, 546 (1st Cir. 1976); Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 258 (3d 
Cir. 2010); Johnson v. Hawe, 388 F.3d 676, 685 (9th Cir. 2004); Graber, 2010 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 7, at *17; State 
v. Flora, 845P.2d 1355, 1358 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992); Hornberger, 351 N.J. Super. at 627; Agnew v. Dupler, 717 
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106
 See Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 80 (1st Cir. 2011) (describing how the police officer only arrested Glik for 
illegal recording after he acknowledged that his cellular phone recorded audio). 
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 See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 165.540 (West 2003); State v. Neff, 265 P.3d 62, 63–64 (Or. Ct. App. 2011). 
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 Glik, 655 F.3d at 87. 
109
 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99 (West 2000). 
110
 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99 (West 2000); Glik, 655 F.3d at 79. 
111
 Glik, 655 F.3d at 79. 
112
 Id.  
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established” right to film police officers in public without indicating precisely which aspect of 
Glik’s conduct was protected First Amendment activity.113   
Overall, anti-wiretapping statutes are valuable for police officers seeking to suppress 
videographers.  Since the laws lack clarity and well-defined scope, police can creatively and 
effectively cite anti-wiretapping statutes to intimidate even savvy videographers.  However, if 
police do not assert charges from these anti-wiretapping statutes, they still have laws of general 
applicability at their disposal.
114
   
Laws of general applicability are charges like obstruction of justice and may also include 
disobeying an officer, obstructing an investigation, interfering with an officer, failure to obey an 
officer, disorderly conduct, resisting arrest, obstructing a street, and harassment.
115
  While many 
of these charges may be dismissed, people are still arrested, placed into squad cars, and carted 
away from the scene in the first place.
116
  Videographers may be fully within their rights to 
videotape the police, but after one confrontation they may expect intimidation, harassment, or 
arrest because often “nothing” happens to the police officers who make false arrests.117  Police 
are increasingly exercising laws of general applicability to suppress videographers from filming 
police conduct because citizens often do not know the laws, which allows police to think they 
can get away with applying the charges.
118
  Overall, the inconvenience and embarrassment of 
being arrested creates a chilling effect for videographers that makes laws of general applicability 
                                                 
113
 Id. at 85. 
114
See Stossel, supra note 91; Kreimer, supra note 14, at 361 (“Where wiretap prohibitions do not apply, officers 
faced with defiant videographers frequently turn to broader criminal statutes that provide substantial enforcement 
discretion.”). 
115
 Stossel, supra note 91. 
116
 Id. 
117
 Id. (quoting Radley Balko from the interview). 
118
 Kreimer, supra note 14, at 394 (“[O]ne growing source of litigation is the tendency of police officers to arrest 
photographers on trumped-up charges both as a way of preventing the spread of inconvenient truths and as a 
response to free-floating anxiety about individuals who remind officials of terrorists.”); ReasonTV, supra note 43. 
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another valuable tool for police officers who seek to suppress videographers from filming police 
conduct.
119
   
IV.  Safeguards to Police Misconduct are Ineffectively Protecting Videographers 
 When Radley Balka said that “nothing” happens to police officers who unlawfully 
intimidate videographers, he did not comprehensively describe how police officers have to 
answer for their actions.
120
  Balka did not mean that literally nothing happens following an 
incident between police and videographers, but rather that police do not face serious 
consequences for their actions.
121
  This Part discusses how the present framework of safeguards 
designed to deter police from harassing citizens fails to adequately protect videographers who 
are unlawfully intimidated by police.  Specifically, this Part will cover the failure of three 
safeguards:  first, the external check provided by the public at large; second, self-policing 
mechanisms such as internal affairs within police departments; and third, the civil remedy 
available to a citizen who believes a public official has violated his constitutional rights.  This 
Part will demonstrate how each of these deterrents is ineffective at curbing potential police 
misconduct toward videographers.  
A.  Safeguard #1: Public Oversight and How Police Can Defeat Its Purpose By Eliminating 
Public Recording of Their Conduct 
 Some scholars argue that allowing citizens to freely videotape police in public 
incentivizes police officers to properly fulfill their duties.
122
  Leaders at some police departments 
                                                 
119
 See Wasserman, supra note 14, at 648–49 (“Government might stop people from recording public encounters . . . 
through enactment and enforcement of express prohibitions on secret or unconsented-to recordings of persons and 
conversations . . . [or] through officers’ efforts to move filmers away from the scene, to confiscate equipment, and 
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 See Stossel, supra note 91. 
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 See id. 
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 Mishra, supra note 103, at 1553. 
21 
 
have adopted this view as well.
123
  Lieutenant Robin Larson, of the Broward County, Florida, 
Sheriff’s Office, for instance, takes the position that “all our people should be conducting 
themselves like they are being recorded all the time.”124  With the persistent threat of 
surveillance, rational police officers would want to avoid committing any misconduct in public 
because video documentation of that misconduct could be widely disseminated very rapidly.
125
  
In that event, the general public, aware of the misconduct, could utilize the political process to 
pressure law enforcement officers to respect the limits of their authority.
126
  Thus, mindful of 
potential public scrutiny and scorn, police officers would generally avoid performing illegal 
activities to protect themselves.
127
 
The existence of some press coverage and public scrutiny of police misconduct indicates 
that this deterrent is somewhat effective, but the evidence of police-videographer confrontations 
in the news and on the internet suggests that police are undermining the effectiveness of video by 
attempting to eliminate it.
128
  By intimidating and arresting videographers, police are creating 
more footage of police-videographer confrontations, but may also be preventing footage of more 
alarming misconduct, such as the beatings of Jack McKenna or Rodney King, from being 
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 See id. 
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kind of street-level oversight that cellphone and video technology make possible.”). 
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created.
129
  An example is the case of Emily Good, a Rochester woman whose video-
confrontation with police garnered national attention.
130
  Rochester police officers arrested Good 
for obstructing governmental administration when she filmed a traffic stop directly outside her 
home.
131
  Good was somewhat of a social activist and she filmed the traffic stop because she 
believed it involved racial profiling.
132
  Police commanded Good to stop recording the incident, 
but when she continued one of the officers arrested her.
133
  Although a highly publicized 
discussion about Good’s rights sprouted from the incident, police successfully frustrated Good’s 
original purpose for filming.
134
  Good’s objective was to monitor police conduct in regard to 
racial profiling, a rather serious issue, but the Rochester police officers succeeded in preventing 
her from documenting anything related to that issue.
135
 
The Good case highlights why the public-oversight deterrent fails to protect 
videographers from harassment and intimidation.
136
  Instead of incentivizing officers to conduct 
their police business properly, the presence of a video camera may actually encourage a police 
officer to prevent the creation of footage of his conduct.
137
  To do so, the police officer may 
harass, intimidate, and arrest the videographer and ultimately shield himself from liability for 
potentially serious acts of misconduct.
138
  While some videographers may be defiant and willing 
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to resist police pressures, many individuals may simply seek to avoid confrontation and instead 
move on with their lives.
139
  The ultimate result is a chilling effect of filming police in public. 
 Granted, if the footage of the police officer attacking the videographer is as offensive as 
the Rodney King beating, the public would probably demand accountability in a similar 
manner.
140
  Still, this deterrent may only be effective when videographers are successful in 
capturing police misconduct that warrants unified public outcry.  Police harassment of 
videographers certainly warrants public scrutiny, but because the act of intimidating a 
videographer is not nearly as offensive as police beatings, shootings, or corruption scandals, it is 
not as likely to stir an equally strong public reaction.
141
  Ideally, the issues surrounding police 
confrontations with videographers ought to be resolved before an incident similar to Rodney 
King’s reoccurs. 
 Overall, another solution is needed because public awareness is not enough to prevent 
police officers from intimidating and arresting videographers.  By aggressively engaging 
videographers, police effectively chill videographers from monitoring police conduct which 
simultaneously shields other types of misconduct from exposure.
142
  Since the public is not as 
offended as it would be if other types of misconduct were captured on camera, it is not as 
motivated to remedy the situation. 
B.  Safeguard #2: Internal Affairs: Why Law Enforcement Self-Policing Is Insufficient 
 Law enforcement leadership is in a position to self-correct police misconduct through 
internal investigations and disciplining police officers.
143
  In the past, police leadership has 
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sternly held violating officers accountable for their actions.
144
  Also, some police departments 
claim that the increase in public video-recording of police conduct has positively affected change 
in department training and staffing.
145
  Broadly speaking, internal affairs has sometimes been 
effective in combating forms of police misconduct.
146
   
 While police departments should be able to self-regulate, this established deterrent has 
demonstrated several limitations.  Especially in the context of police officers harassing and 
intimidating videographers, it is unlikely that any substantial consequences will result when a 
videographer complains to the police department.
147
  For instance, in Emily Good’s case, 
Rochester Chief of Police James M. Sheppard conducted an investigation that resulted in no 
announced disciplinary action but merely additional training and awareness for officers on the 
force.
148
  Because the internal investigations are not transparent, the public has no way of 
actually knowing if they are effective in correcting the problem.
149
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 Another problem with the internal-affairs model for reporting police misconduct is that in 
the context of video records, citizens may be afraid to report.
150
  In Massachusetts, Michael Hyde 
was arrested for violating wiretapping statutes while trying to report police abuse.
151
  Six days 
after Hyde recorded an incident with police, he went to file a formal complaint at the Abington 
police station.
152
  After the Abington police department performed an internal investigation, 
which absolved five of its officers, it also sought a criminal complaint against Hyde for the 
recording he used to complain about the officers.
153
  Since Hyde’s conviction was upheld, 
videographers can be fearful, especially in states like Massachusetts with two-party-consent 
wiretapping laws,
154
 that reporting incidents to the local police station could result in their own 
arrest. 
 Another example is the case of Anthony Graber in Maryland.
 155
  Maryland State Police 
raided Graber’s home and seized his camera and computer equipment after he posted a video of 
himself being pulled-over by a police officer on YouTube.
156
  Graber was facing more than 
fifteen  years in prison if he was convicted of violating Maryland’s anti-wiretapping statute.157  
Fortunately for Graber, Circuit Judge Emory Pitt threw out the four-count indictment against 
Graber.
158
  Although Graber was ultimately vindicated, the prospect of spending over fifteen 
years in prison for what may have been protected First Amendment activity is quite horrifying.
159
  
If a different Judge presided over his case, it is very possible that Graber would be sitting in 
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prison until approximately the year 2026.
160
  Although Graber was not reporting police 
misconduct to the police, the effort by police to arrest Graber long after the traffic stop indicates 
that if Graber had tried to report police conduct the way that Hyde did, he may have been 
arrested in the same manner.
161
  Any videographer with footage of police misconduct might be 
hesitant to bring such footage to the police’s attention if it may jeopardize his freedom. 
 Overall, law enforcement self-policing is unreliable in safeguarding against police 
aggression toward videographers.  Police officers are typically not punished harshly for violating 
the rights of videographers and the reporting mechanism for concerned citizens poses too great 
of a risk of arrest.
162
  If a citizen wishes to complain to police about an officer’s conduct, he may 
hesitate to bring his video evidence of the alleged misconduct.  So with no reason to take internal 
investigations seriously and too much risk for citizens to bring video evidence of misconduct to 
the police’s attention, it is unlikely that internal affairs can properly deter police officers from 
violating videographers rights to film police in public.   
C.  Safeguard #3: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Civil Remedies and Their Shortcomings 
 As part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,
163
 Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to provide 
civil remedies for citizens whose rights have been abused “under the color” of state law.164  The 
statute allows a private citizen to sue for damages and prospective relief against municipalities 
and local governments
165
 when officials violate their civil rights.
166
  Section 1983 is not itself a 
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source of substantive rights; rather, it is merely a remedy or method for citizens to vindicate their 
rights as guaranteed by the Constitution.
167
  In defining the remedy, the Supreme Court has noted 
that § 1983 is intended to financially compensate victims of official misconduct.
168
   
When a lawsuit is filed against a police officer in his official capacity, the suit is known 
as an “official-capacity suit” and is treated as a suit against the government itself.169  To prevail 
in a § 1983 official-capacity suit, a plaintiff must show that “the entity’s policy or custom played 
a part in the violation of federal law.”170  Thus, for the government to be liable, the Supreme 
Court requires the agent to directly harm the plaintiff on behalf of the government after it 
implemented a policy, statement, regulation, or custom to be the “moving force” behind the 
agent’s action.171  Besides a direct policy endorsing unlawful conduct, a failure to properly train 
agents and employees can be a “moving force” behind the agent’s wrongful conduct.172  The 
failure to train must amount to “deliberate indifference,” however,  meaning that the government 
entity made a deliberate choice to not train police officers with respect to the violated right in 
question.
173
  But, § 1983 plaintiffs will not succeed in showing “deliberate indifference” where a 
police officer’s conduct  is “obvious to all without training or supervision.”174 
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Doubts exist as to whether § 1983 is an effective remedy.
175
  Absent a discoverable 
pattern of violations, in order to claim that the government was “deliberately indifferent,” the 
plaintiff would have to show that the failure to train officers made violations of federal rights 
“highly predictable.”176  This requirement is farcical because the existence of a pattern does not 
change that an individual’s rights have been violated in one specific instance.  A pattern, by 
definition, requires multiple occurrences of linkable events, but the plaintiff in any given § 1983 
suit should not need to worry about anyone else’s violated rights.  Whether others have had their 
rights similarly violated is irrelevant in regard to compensating an individual for his injuries.  
Attempting to prove that a failure to train made commission of violations “highly predictable” is 
dubious as well.
177
  To determine if a violation is “highly predictable,” the court will determine if 
the propensity to arrest videographers is a “plainly obvious consequence” of the government 
entity’s decision-making procedures.178  This attenuated process ultimately circles back to 
searching for a pattern of violations in the past, which, as discussed, seems unimportant in 
relation to the fact that the plaintiff’s rights were violated.179 
As it is difficult to find the municipality liable for a violation, additionally, the 
individually-offending officers may be shielded from liability by the doctrine of qualified 
immunity.
180
  The qualified-immunity doctrine is intended to shield public officials from 
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harassment, distraction, and liability when they are legitimately performing their duties.
181
  
Public officials are entitled to qualified immunity from personal liability when their actions arise 
out of discretionary functions.
182
  To circumvent a police officer’s qualified-immunity defense, 
the plaintiff must show or allege a violation of a “clearly established” constitutional right at the 
time of the police officer’s alleged violation.183  Determining if a constitutional right was 
“clearly established” requires two inquiries: whether the law was clear at the time of the alleged 
civil rights violation; and, whether a reasonable police officer would have understood that his 
conduct violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.184   
In examining the “clearly established” requirement, the clarity of the law at the time of 
the alleged violation must be narrowly determined with respect to the specific facts of the 
case.
185
  In addressing how specific the law must be in order to deny an officer qualified 
immunity, a broad and generalized conceptualization of the law is not sufficient.
186
  However, 
this standard does not require that a prior court decision be on point.
187
  The Supreme Court’s 
decision in Hope v. Pelzer established that firm precedent is not necessary for a plaintiff to 
recover against an official.
188
 The reasonableness of a police officer depends on “whether the 
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state of the law at the time of the alleged violation gave the [officer] fair warning that his 
particular conduct was unconstitutional.”189   
Despite the plaintiff-friendly standard developed in Hope, the absence of cases on point is 
still a basis for dismissal on qualified immunity.
190
 In dismissing for qualified immunity, the 
Supreme Court, in Brosseau, stressed the lack of similar cases where a police officer shot and 
wounded the plaintiff, who alleged that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated.
191
 The 
Court’s dissonance with its own decision in Hope has created confusion in lower courts and 
clouded the “clearly established” standard for qualified immunity.192  Often, police officers will 
have qualified immunity, which creates a heavy burden for a videographer seeking damages 
from an individual police officer.
193
  In practice, “[t]he qualified immunity standard gives ample 
room for mistaken judgments by protecting all but the plainly incompetent or those who 
knowingly violate the law.”194  Essentially, if the law is confusing, police officers may be able to 
invoke qualified immunity.
195
   
In regard to incidents involving recording police, some courts have allowed arresting 
officers to invoke qualified immunity after wrongful conduct.
196
  An example is Kelly v. Borough 
of Carlisle, where a police officer arrested a passenger and seized his camera for filming him 
during a traffic stop.
197
  Maintaining the officer’s qualified immunity, the Third Circuit 
recognized a broad right to videotape police, but not a “clearly established” right due to the 
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confusing state of the law.
198
  Because the case law was murky, a reasonably competent officer 
could not be put on “fair notice” that seizing a camera and arresting the videographer would 
violate the First Amendment.
199
  Additionally, after the police officer initially seized the 
passenger’s camera, he called the assistant district attorney to inquire whether the passenger 
actually violated Pennsylvania’s anti-wiretap statute.200  Unfortunately, the assistant district 
attorney misunderstood the law and recommended that the police officer arrest the passenger.
201
  
Although this fact vindicates the officer’s reasonableness in making the final arrest, the officer 
still seized the camera before contacting the local prosecutor.
202
  If the police officer inquired 
before confiscating the videographer’s camera, it would be difficult to argue that his conduct was 
unreasonable.
203
  That was not the case but, nevertheless, the police officer was vindicated.
204
 
In circumstances where a § 1983 litigant is successful, the statute permits courts to 
fashion a range of both legal and equitable remedies, but severely limits injunctive relief.
205
  
Specifically, federal courts are not in a position to enjoin municipal police departments.
206
  
Without injunctive relief, successful plaintiffs could seek compensatory damages for injuries, but 
in order for the court to award damages, the plaintiff must suffer actual harm.
207
  Additionally, 
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the Supreme Court has permitted plaintiffs to recover punitive damages from individual police 
officers, but not from municipalities.
208
  However, punitive damages are only available from an 
individual officer where his “conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when 
it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federal protected rights of others.”209 
For videographers, whose right to film has been violated, § 1983 remedies are not very 
helpful.  First, losing the ability to film does not constitute what is typically considered an 
“actual injury” deserving of compensation.210 In Carey v. Piphus, despite finding that the 
plaintiffs were denied due process when they were wrongly suspended from school, the Supreme 
Court rejected anything but nominal damages because the plaintiffs lacked evidence of actual 
injury.
211
  Subsequently, the Court interpreted Carey as denying any concept of presumed 
damages.
212
  In Memphis Community School District v. Stachura, the Supreme Court solidified 
the Carey principle when it concluded that damages under § 1983 exist only to compensate 
plaintiffs who are actually injured, noting that “damages based on the ‘value’ or ‘importance’ of 
constitutional rights are not authorized . . . because they are not truly compensatory.”213 Punitive 
rights are similarly unattainable because of the ambiguous “evil motive or intent” standard 
required, the limitation against application to municipalities, and the likelihood that qualified 
immunity will be shield an offending officer.
214
 Therefore, because First Amendment rights such 
as free speech and news-gathering cannot be monetized, § 1983 fails to adequately protect 
aggrieved videographers.
215
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Overall, although § 1983 initially looks like a decent remedy, it is too narrow for 
videographers because the burden for establishing a municipality’s liability is too heavy, 
qualified immunity shields offending officers, and courts do not provide adequate damages when 
officers violate constitutional rights.  Since the likelihood of a plaintiff receiving compensation 
for his injury is rather diminished, it follows that the rules of § 1983 seem to favor protecting 
police officers who did not know or care that a right existed over preservation of the right itself.  
Absent a prescribed remedy for violations, § 1983 fails to safeguard against unreasonable law 
enforcement intrusions.
216
  Although § 1983 was put in place to address citizens’ grievances for 
violations of their constitutional rights, in the context of citizens filming police it fails to remedy 
anything, which results in no deterrence for police officers and no protection for videographers. 
V.  Bright-Line Rule: Explicitly Stated Remedies and Personal Liability 
 The purpose of this Part is to provide a model legislative framework for protecting 
videographers against police harassment.  First, this Part will discuss the rationale behind the 
model and how the legislation should meet the shortcomings of § 1983 civil rights actions.  
Then, this Part will present the model legislation itself, which state governments could consider, 
amend, and enact to protect videographers from police intimidation. 
A.  Considerations in Constructing a Videographer Protection Law 
 Police should be deterred from intimidating and harassing videographers who film their 
conduct in public.
217
  To effectively deter police officers, the choice of whether or not to violate 
an individual’s rights must be eliminated from a reasonable police officer’s mind.  Rationally, in 
making every decision a police officer would most likely balance interests of privacy, safety, and 
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self-preservation in deciding whether or not to act in a certain situation.  If the balancing of these 
values is altered by making a police officer, in the interest of self-preservation, not want to 
violate a videographer’s First Amendment rights, then the deterrent is effective. 
 The framers of the Constitution recognized that police power could potentially be abused 
and in turn harm free society.
218
  Communities entrust police officers with powers that are 
sometimes abused.
219
  Permitting individuals to record interactions with police without fear of 
prosecution is essential to balance the government’s need to enforce laws and a citizen’s right to 
be free from government abuse.
220
  When abuses occur, police officers ought to be fully 
accountable for their actions.
221
  Protecting certain police interests, such as privacy when 
performing official public functions, is “inconsistent with democracy and democratic political 
accountability” when it results in a violation of a private citizen’s guaranteed First Amendment 
rights.
222
  Police should not be insulated from consequences when their conduct is unlawful.
223
  
Instead, police officers’ discretionary power should be reduced so that they have less of an 
opportunity to harm citizens’ First Amendment rights without a challenge.224 
 In the narrow context of protecting citizens who are filming police officers in the public 
discharge of their duties, an effective means of deterring police misconduct is to have a strict law 
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that punishes police officers who harass, intimidate, oppress, or arrest an individual because the 
individual is video-recording their conduct.  Legislatures, in constructing such a law, should 
weigh many interests, such as police safety, potential unlawful conduct on behalf of the 
videographer apart from the act of filming, and the overall context of the incident.  But to be 
effective, the primary objective of the law must be to protect a videographer’s rights to be free 
from police abuse. 
 A categorical prohibition on police conduct would be problematic because circumstances 
exist where police action against a videographer is appropriate.
225
  But such circumstances must 
be narrowly construed.  A broad exception based on soft standards like  “reasonableness” could 
render the entire law useless.  To help prevent this from happening, legislatures must define 
possible exceptions to the rule as affirmative defenses.  These exceptions could include that the 
videographer was simultaneously breaking some other criminal statute besides the filming or that 
the police officer or videographer would be in direct, impending danger without the officer’s 
intervention.  Under this model, defendant police officers carry the burden of proving that their 
conduct did in fact fall within the grounds of the exception for what otherwise may have been an 
unlawful violation of a citizen’s First Amendment rights.   
 Since First Amendment rights are unclear from things such as time, place, and manner 
restrictions, and murky wiretapping statutes, a presumption should exist that protects openly 
filming the police officer’s public conduct.226  This presumption would provide the law with a 
“tie-goes-to-the-runner” judgment mechanism which leans toward protecting videographers.227  
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“Tie goes to the runner” would mean that where the First Amendment right’s existence is subject 
to close dispute, the conduct should go undisturbed by police.  Of course, other conduct apart 
from the act of filming may open a videographer to interference from police.  However, possible 
exceptions which allow a police officer to interfere with a videographer’s filming of his conduct 
should revolve around actual, not theoretical, threats to the safety of the videographer, the police 
officer, and other citizens and enforcement of other citizens’ privacy rights. 
 Additionally, for the law to be effective as a deterrent, the remedy must be appropriate.  
The goal of the remedy must be, in part, to offer some compensation to the aggrieved 
videographer, but moreso to punish the violating police officer who may have offended the 
videographer’s First Amendment rights.  Unless the harm done to the videographer can actually 
be categorized under other forms of misconduct such as brutality, the mere intimidation and 
arrest of the videographer should result in direct damages against the violating police officers 
and a short suspension from field duty.  This degree of punitive treatment would raise a greater 
deterrent effect than internal investigations, which at times merely led to additional training 
without any actual discipline.
228
  
 Besides adequate deterrence, the state law should also seek to fill in the holes left by § 
1983 and the federal courts.  Since § 1983 fails to provide adequate damages for those who 
suffer no injury besides a violated constitutional right, legislatures should incorporate liquidated 
or presumed damages into the statute.
229
  In terms of avoiding problems that qualified immunity 
causes, automatic liability eliminates the shield and simultaneously bypasses the entire debate 
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about “clearly established” laws.230  If a state passes the model legislation below, the state 
essentially removes the narrow issue of filming police officers from the complicated and cloudy 
realm of federalism and constitutional law.  Lastly, considering how state legislatures may be 
cautious to micro-manage executive-operated agencies, liability for the municipalities is not part 
of the legislation.  The rationale for this omission is centered around law enforcement’s inability 
to effectively self-police
231
 and to attack individual police officers’ temptations to violate 
videographers’ rights.232 
B.  Model “Videographer Intimidation Protection Act” 
Below is the “Videographer Intimidation Protection Act” or the “V.I.P. Act.”  The 
following is a hypothetical construction of legislation that could effectively deter police from 
violating videographers’ First Amendment right to openly film police conduct in public: 
Section 1: [Violation] No law enforcement officer, in the scope of his or her official 
duties, shall: 
(a) abridge the right of an individual to video-record (including audio) his or her 
conduct, or the conduct of other police officers in a public place; 
(b) harass, intimidate, abuse, question, or arrest any private citizen for the 
purposes of stopping, inhibiting, or preventing an individual from recording any 
law-enforcement officer’s conduct in a public place; or 
(c) demand or require an individual to turn off his or her camera or otherwise stop 
filming for the purpose of stopping, inhibiting, or preventing an individual from 
recording any law enforcement officer’s conduct in a public place; 
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Section 2: [Defenses] A law enforcement officer may present any of the following 
affirmative defenses: 
(a) Actual, not theoretical, threat of impending harm to the police officer that is 
materially related to the videographer’s act of filming; 
(b) Actual, not theoretical, threat of impending harm to the videographer that is 
materially related to the videographer’s act of filming; 
(c) Actual, not theoretical, threat of impending harm to a nearby third party that is 
materially related to the videographer’s act of filming; 
(d) Valid reason exists to confront the videographer outside of his act of filming, 
including but not limited to violations of a criminal statute not related to 
recording a law-enforcement officer’s conduct; or 
(e) Enforcing the privacy rights of private citizens, or a criminal anti-wiretapping 
statute as it pertains to private citizens, but not of any public official acting in 
his or her official capacity. 
Section 3: [Evidence] In the event that the law-enforcement officer destroys the recording 
and cannot successfully assert an affirmative defense, liability is automatically applied. 
Section 4: [Penalty] Where a law-enforcement officer is found to have violated this 
statute, the law-enforcement officer is to be: 
(a) held personally liable for no less than $1,000 but no more than $2,500;
233
 and 
(b) suspended from public duty for at least three days but no more than twenty-
one days. 
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VI. Conclusion 
 A First Amendment right to film police officers in public exists and ought to be 
universally supported.
234
  From case law and scholarly legal commentary, it is more than 
reasonable to conclude that the right exists and, subject to some narrow limitations, should not be 
abridged.
235
  However, individuals’ First Amendment rights are sometimes violated.236  This 
occurs because police officers have interests in resisting the legal community’s statement that 
private citizens have a right to film police officers in public.
237
 
 Police frequently escape liability when they abuse their power because the legal 
landscape is proving to be an enabling environment.
238
  That environment, combined with the 
growing widespread availability of video-recording devices, has police resorting to abuse of their 
power to chill videographer’s actions.239  The current framework of deterrents fails to address 
this chilling effect adequately.
240
  Since the deterrents are too weak, or too avoidable, officers 
can often abuse their power without punishment.
241
 
 To resolve this problem, legislatures should pass a stricter law which directly targets and 
prevents police officers from interfering with videographers filming their conduct.
242
  Had a 
safeguard effectively been enacted, perhaps citizens like Emily Good would not have been 
falsely arrested for openly and unobtrusively monitoring police in the public discharge of their 
duties.
243
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